UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-11-2014

State v. Sparling Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41651

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Sparling Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41651" (2014). Not Reported. 1744.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1744

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

OPY

No. 41651

)

)
vs.

)
)
)

STEVEN W. SPARLING,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________

Owyhee Co. Case No.
CR-2012-9292

)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF OWYHEE

HONORABLETHOMASJ.RYAN
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law. Division
P .0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5
Sparling Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When
It Denied His Motion To Suppress ......................................................... 5
A.

lntroduction ................................................................................. 5

B.

Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5

C.

Trooper Higley Did Not Unconstitutionally Extend
The Scope Or Duration Of The Traffic Stop .............................. 6

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) ........................................................... 11
Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 958 P.2d 592 (1998) ............................................. 8
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ............................................................ 6
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .............................................................. 3
State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1,217 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009) .............................. 11
State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P.3d 706 (Ct. App. 2002) ...................... 7, 8
State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453,641 P.2d 484 (N.M. 1982) ...................................... 8
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P. 3d 739 (2007) .............................................. 5
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991) ................................... 6, 7
State v. Gonzalez, 117 Idaho 518,789 P.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1990) ....................... 8
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct. App. 2008) ................... 6, 7
State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 51 P.3d 1112 (Ct. App. 2002) .................... 8, 11
State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,925 P.2d 1125 (Ct. App. 1996) ........................ 7
State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 233 P.3d 52 (2010) ........................................... 5
State v. Parkinson 135 Idaho 357, 17 P.3d 301 (Ct. App. 2000) .................... 6, 10
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207 P.3d 182 (2009) ......................................... 5
State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 88 P.3d 1220 (Ct. App. 2003) ................ 6, 7, 11
State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 11 P.3d 44 (Ct. App. 2000) .................................... 6
State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 88 P.3d 780 (Ct. App. 2004) ........................ 8
State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005) ........................................... 5
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 211 P.3d 91 (2009) ...................................... 8

ii

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ........................................................................... 6
United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006) ................... 11
United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2003) ...................................... 11
United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) ......................................... 11
United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 2007) ......................... 11
United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.1993) ...................................... 10
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) ...................................................... 8

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Steven W. Sparling appeals from the order withholding judgment entered
upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.
On appeal, he challenges the district court's order denying his motion to
suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Idaho State Trooper Blake Higley observed a vehicle turn into a gas
station parking lot without signaling.
Exhibit A, 0:05 - 0:20.)

(Prelim Tr., p.5, Ls.14-19; Defendant's

The trooper parked behind the vehicle and activated his

emergency overhead lights. (Prelim Tr., p.6, Ls.6-8; Defendant's Exhibit A, 0:28
- 0:40.) As the trooper approached, the driver of the vehicle, later identified as
Steven Sparling, exited his vehicle and approached the patrol car. (Prelim Tr.,
p.6, Ls.4-21; Defendant's exhibit A, 0:40 - 0:50.)

The trooper explained the

reason for the stop, requested identification, and asked Sparling where he was
coming from. (Prelim Tr., p.6, Ls.6-22; Defendant's Exhibit A, 0:50 - 3:15.) The
trooper noticed that Sparling's hands were shaking, that he was "extremely
anxious to separate himself from the vehicle," had "a lot of nervous energy," and
wasn't able to stand still. (Prelim Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.6; Defendant's Exhibit A,
1:00 - 5:30.)
Trooper Higley then returned to his patrol vehicle and requested the
presence of certified canine officer Keith Whitworth, who was in the area. (Prelim
Tr., p.8, Ls.2-4.) The trooper then returned to Sparling's vehicle, where Sparling
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consented to a search of his person
4:30 - 5: 1

(Prelim Tr., p.8, Ls.5-6; Defendant's Exhibit

During that search, the trooper smelled the odor of marijuana

coming from Sparling.

(Prelim Tr., p.8, Ls.7-8.)

The trooper asked Sparling

when he had last used marijuana, and Sparling admitted that he had done so "a
couple of days ago." (Prelim Tr., p.8, Ls.8-9; Defendant's Exhibit A, 5: 15 - 5:30.)
Sparling also admitted that there were some marijuana "roaches" in the center
console of his vehicle.

(Prelim Tr., p.8, Ls.8-11; Defendant's Exhibit A, 5:25-

5:40.)
While this conversation occurred, Officer Whitworth deployed his drug dog
around Sparling's vehicle.
5:20 - 7:10.)

(Prelim Tr., p.30, Ls.16-21; Defendant's Exhibit A,

The dog alerted on the vehicle.

(Prelim Tr., p.30, Ls.21-23.)

Trooper Higley and another officer then searched Sparling's vehicle and located
a large bag of marijuana "roaches" and other drug paraphernalia in the center
console, and two leather bags containing a total of 388 grams of marijuana in the
trunk. (Prelim Tr., p.10, Ls.15-21; PSI, p.3.) Sparling told Trooper Higley that he
had planned to give the marijuana to a friend in the Boise area. (Prelim Tr., p.11,
Ls.18-22.)
The state charged Sparling with possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.9-11.) After
a preliminary hearing, the case was bound over to the district court. (R., pp.2022; see generally Prelim. Tr.)
Sparling filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his
vehicle. (R., pp.33-35.) Specifically, Sparling argued that Trooper Hilgey's initial
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traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and that even if was, the
trooper

duration and scope of the stop to conduct a

investigation. (Id.) Spariing also argued that his admissions to the trooper were
inadmissible pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), (Id.)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court admitted a DVD
of the traffic stop into evidence, and took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing
transcript.

(See generally 1/25/13 Tr.)

At the conclusion of the hearing, the

district court denied Sparling's motion to suppress. (R., pp.70-72; 1/25/13 Tr.,
p.74, L.24-p.106, L.3.)
Sparling entered an I.C.R. 11 conditional guilty plea to possession of
marijuana with the intent to deliver, preserving his right to appeal the district
court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.89-99; 7/12/13 Tr., p.4, L.19p.9, L.25.)

Pursuant to the agreement, the state dismissed the misdemeanor

drug paraphernalia charge.

(R., pp.117-118; 7/12/13 Tr., p.1, Ls.17-23.) The

district court entered a withheld judgment and placed Sparling on probation for
two years. (R., pp.113-115; 10/25/13 Tr., p.11, L.5 - p.13, L.9.)
appealed. (R., pp.126-128.)
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Sparling timely

ISSUE
states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Sparling's motion
to suppress after his initially lawful seizure was unreasonably
extended?
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Sparling failed to show the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
Sparling Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion
To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Sparling contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Sparling contends that
the district court erred in concluding that Trooper Higley did not unconstitutionally
expand the scope and duration of the traffic stop. (Id.) However, a review of the
record reveals that Trooper Higley did not significantly expand the scope and
duration of the stop for the purpose of a drug investigation until he had
reasonable suspicion to do so.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147
Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230,
232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The appellate court will accept the trial court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the trial
court's application of constitutional principles and determinations of reasonable
suspicion, in light of the facts found. Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183
(citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)), State v.
\,

Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127, 233 P.3d 52, 58 (2010).
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Trooper Higley Did Not Unconstitutionally Extend The Scope Or Duration
Of The Traffic Stop
It is well-settled

a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth

Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. State v. Gallegos, 120
Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). Because a routine vehicle traffic stop
is normally limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho
980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
With regard to the permissible scope of a traffic stop, officers may conduct
brief inquiries unrelated to the purpose of the stop, as long as the duration of the
stop is not significantly extended.

State v. Parkinson 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17

P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2000). For example, an officer conducting a legal traffic
stop may permissibly ask for consent to search the vehicle while the driver is still
detained, when that request only momentarily extends the stop. State v. Silva,
134 Idaho 848, 852-53, 11 P.3d 44, 48-49 (Ct. App. 2000). An officer may also
ask the driver for his license and registration, request that the driver exit his
vehicle, and ask the driver about his destination and purpose on the road.
Parkinson 135 Idaho at 363, 17 P.3d at 307; State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,
496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008).
With regard to duration, "[a]n investigative detention must be temporary
and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134 (citations omitted). "There is no
6

rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer than
necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the law
enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop."

A

detention becomes unreasonable if an officer significantly extends the duration of
the stop to investigate other criminal conduct. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983-984,
88 P.3d at 1223-1224.
However, the purpose of a stop, and the length of the stop to effectuate its
purpose, is not necessarily fixed at the time of initiation.

See, ~ , State v.

Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Although the
vehicular stop began as one to investigate the operation of an unregistered
automobile, information quickly developed which justified expansion of the
detention to investigate a possible drug offense."). Thus, a routine traffic stop
may be lawfully extended to deploy a drug sniffing dog where, during the stop,
the officer acquires reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle possesses
drugs.

kl;

Grantham, 146 Idaho at 497, 198 P.3d at 135.

The "reasonable suspicion" standard requires an officer to articulate
specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify
the suspicion that the person is or has been involved in criminal activity.
Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 951-952; State v. Martinez, 129
Idaho 426, 430, 925 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Ct. App. 1996). Reasonable suspicion is
a less demanding standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896,
821 P.2d at 951. Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to
detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances.
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State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004).
Although a series

facts may appear innocent when viewed separateiy, they

may warrant further investigation when viewed together. Brumfield, 136 Idaho at
917, 42 P.3d at 710. The presence of reasonable suspicion is an objective test
that does not depend on the individual officer's subjective thought processes.
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) (citing Deen v.
State, 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998)); see also Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996).
"The smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement
for a warrantless search." State v. Gonzalez, 117 Idaho 518, 789 P.2d 206 (Ct.
App. 1990) (quoting State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484,487 (N.M. 1982)
(emphasis in original)). A suspect's excessive nervousness may contribute to a
finding of reasonable suspicion. See State v. Johnson. 137 Idaho 656, 660, 51
P .3d 1112, 1116 (Ct. App. 2002).
In this case, Sparling does not challenge the legality of the initial traffic
stop, the eventual finding of probable cause that justified the search of his
vehicle, or any of the district court's factual determinations.
Appellant's brief.)

(See generally

Instead, Sparling contends that Trooper Higley violated his

Fourth Amendment rights by expanding the scope and duration of the traffic stop
"beyond the time necessary to issue a citation" for the underlying traffic offense.
(Id.) However, as the district court correctly concluded, there was no significant
extension of the stop prior to the point at which Trooper Higley obtained probable
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cause to search the vehicle, and even if there was, such an extension was
justified by reasonable suspicion

activity.

The traffic stop was short in duration. Approximately four minutes elapsed
between Trooper Higley's initial contact with Sparling outside of Sparling's
vehicle, and the consensual pat-down search - the time at which Trooper Higley
smelled the odor of marijuana coming from Sparling.

(Defendant's Exhibit A,

0:51 - 4:52.) On appeal, Sparling does not appear to contest that the officers
had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and to deploy the drug dog by
this latter point, after Trooper Higley smelled the marijuana.

Therefore, the

relevant questions in this case are: (1) whether the officers significantly extended
the duration and scope of the traffic stop beyond its original purpose in those four
minutes; and (2) if so, whether any such brief extension was justified by
reasonable suspicion.
A review of the preliminary hearing transcript and video of the encounter
reveals that most, if not all, of the relevant four-minute portion of the traffic stop
consisted of routine questions regarding the failure to signal infraction, and
permissible "brief inquiries unrelated to the purpose of the stop." After informing
him of the reason for the stop, Trooper Higley asked Sparling for his license and
registration, whether he was still living at the address depicted on the license,
where he was coming from, what he did for a living, whether the contracting
business was as slow in California as it was in Idaho, why he appeared to be so
nervous, and whether he would consent to a search of his vehicle. (Defendant's
Exhibit A, 0:51 - 3:12.) Then, after briefly returning to his patrol vehicle, Trooper

9

Higley informed Sparling that he intended to have another officer deploy a drug
dog.

(Defendant's Exhibit

- 4:48.)

Immediately after this, (and

approximately 20 seconds after returning from his patrol vehicle to re-engage
Sparling), Trooper Higley smelled marijuana during a consensual search of
Sparling's person.

(Defendant's Exhibit A, 4:52 - 5: 18.) Thus, there was no

significant or unreasonable extension of the duration or scope of the stop until
the drug dog was actually deployed - at which point Trooper Higley had already
smelled marijuana and had obtained, at the very least, reasonable suspicion to
extend the stop.
On appeal, Sparling questions the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding in
Parkinson, in which the Court noted that "brief inquiries not otherwise related to
the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth
Amendment rights." (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11 (noting that the Idaho Supreme
Court "is not bound" to follow Parkinson).) In Parkinson, the Court of Appeals
recognized a federal circuit split on the issue of whether, and to what extent, an
officer's questioning unrelated to the purposes of a traffic stop is itself a Fourth
Amendment violation. Parkinson 135 Idaho at 362, 17 P .3d at 306.

The Court

ultimately sided with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected that notion.

kt

(citing United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993)).

More

recently, the United States Supreme Court held that "[a]n officer's inquiries into
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries
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extend the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson,

u

(citation omitted).
While the above-cited portion of Parkinson dealt with brief expansions of

the scope of detentions, the Idaho appellate courts and the United States
Supreme Court have also declined to take a bright-line approach with respect to
brief expansions of the duration of traffic stops.

Rather than hold that any brief

extension of a traffic stop for reasons unrelated to the purpose of the stop
violates the Fourth Amendment, these courts have described an unconstitutional
delay as one that is "significant" or "measurable" or as one that occurs after the
original purpose of the stop has been fulfilled.

See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984,

88 P.3d at 1224; Johnson 555 U.S. at 333-334; State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1,
8, 217 P.3d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009); see also United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484
F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n officer does not violate the Fourth
Amendment by asking a few questions about matters unrelated to the traffic
violation, even if this conversation briefly extends the length of the detention")
(citing United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514, 518-519 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 951-954 (7th Cir. 2002)).

In this case, as discussed

above, even if any such delay occurred, it was very short, and not intrusive.
Such a delay cannot be considered "significant," "measurable," or "unreasonable"
in the context of this stop.
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In the alternative, even if some portion of the relevant four-minute period
constituted a significant or measurable extension of the duration and scope of the
stop, Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to justify such an extension. First,
Sparling's unusual behavior indicated a desire to "separate himself from the
vehicle" and from the contents therein. (Prelim Tr. p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.23.) After
Trooper Higley pulled in behind Sparling, rather than wait in his car for the
trooper to approach, Sparling immediately left his vehicle and walked towards the
patrol car. (Defendant's Exhibit A, 0:35 - 0:50.) During the initial questioning,
Sparling also twice left his vehicle without being asked to do so. (Defendant's
Exhibit A, 1:25 - 1:42; 2:25 - 2:55.)

Second, Sparling exhibited extreme

nervousness. Trooper Higley observed that Sparling's hands were shaking, that
he had nervous energy, and that he couldn't stand still. (Defendant's Exhibit A,
1 :00 - 5:30; Prelim Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.6.) Sparling's unusual behavior, efforts

to separate himself from his vehicle, and extreme nervousness constituted
reasonable suspicion for Trooper Higley to briefly extend the traffic stop.
Sparling has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that
Trooper Higley did not unconstitutionally extend either the scope or the duration
of the traffic stop. This Court should therefore affirm the district court's denial of
Sparling's motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
The state

affirm

district court's

denial of Sparling's motion to suppress.
DATED this 11th day of August 2014

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of August 2014, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~LS~~"
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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